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Abstract
We describe a modular programming style that harnesses modern type systems to verify safety conditions
in practical systems. This style has three ingredients:
(i) A compact kernel of trust that is speciﬁc to the problem domain.
(ii) Unique names (capabilities) that confer rights and certify properties, so as to extend the trust from
the kernel to the rest of the application.
(iii) Static (type) proxies for dynamic values.
We illustrate our approach using examples from the dependent-type literature, but our programs are written
in Haskell and OCaml today, so our techniques are compatible with imperative code, native mutable arrays,
and general recursion. The three ingredients of this programming style call for (1) an expressive core
language, (2) higher-rank polymorphism, and (3) phantom types.
Keywords: Modular programming, veriﬁcation, safety property, static types
1 Introduction
This paper demonstrates a lightweight notion of static capabilities [32] that brings
together increasingly expressive type systems and increasingly accessible program
veriﬁcation. Like many programmers, before verifying that our code is correct,
we want to assure safety conditions: array indices remain within bounds; modular
arithmetic operates on numbers with the same modulus; a ﬁle or database handle
is used only while open; and so on. The safety conditions protect objects such
as arrays, modular numbers, and ﬁles. Our overarching view is that a capability
authorizes access to a protected object and simultaneously certiﬁes that a safety
condition holds. Rather than proposing a new language or system, our contribu-
tion is to substantiate the slogan that types are capabilities, today: we use concrete
and straightforward code in Haskell and OCaml to illustrate that a programming
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language with an appropriately expressive type system is a static capability lan-
guage. Because the capabilities are checked at compile time, we achieve the safety
assurances with minimal impact to run-time performance.
Section 2 presents a simpliﬁed introductory example: empty-list checking. Sec-
tion 3 turns to a full-featured example: array-bound checking. In each case, we
formalize our technique as a syntactic translation between two languages. Section 4
distills the three ingredients of our programming style and describes how expressive
it needs the type system to be. Section 5 discusses related and future work.
Our technique scales up: First, shown in the Appendix is a more substantial
example, Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search. Second, the Takusen database-access
project uses our technique to verify the safety of session handles, cursors, prepared-
statement handles, and result sets. For instance, any operation on a session is
guaranteed to receive a valid session handle. We take our examples from Xi’s pi-
oneering work on practical dependent-type systems and Dependent ML, as well as
from user suggestions.
2 Empty-list checking
We start with a simpliﬁed introductory example. Although it does not show all
features of our approach, it sets the pattern we follow throughout the paper. The
example is list reversal with an accumulator, which can be written in OCaml as
let rec rev l acc = if null l then acc
else rev (tail l) (cons (head l) acc)
The code is written for an arbitrary data structure satisfying the list API (null,
cons, head and tail), so it does not use pattern matching.
The functions head and tail are partial because they do not make sense for the
empty list. Therefore, these functions, to be safe, must check their argument for
null before deconstructing it. This code for rev checks the same list l for null three
times: once directly by calling null, and twice indirectly in head and tail.
We can remove excessive checks and gain conﬁdence in the code by prohibit-
ing attempts to deconstruct the empty list. We ﬁrst deﬁne an abstract data type
’a fullList with the interface and implementation below.
module FL : sig
type ’a fullList
val unfl : ’a fullList -> ’a list
val indeed : ’a list -> ’a fullList option
val head : ’a fullList -> ’a
val tail : ’a fullList -> ’a list
end = struct
type ’a fullList = ’a list
let unfl l = l
let indeed l = if null l then None else Some l
let head l = Unsafe.head l
let tail l = Unsafe.tail l
end
O. Kiselyov, C.-c. Shan / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 174 (2007) 79–10480
Here Unsafe.head blindly gives the head of its list argument, without checking if
the argument is null. We claim that in well-typed programs the functions FL.head
and FL.tail are total.
Our list reversal with accumulator is now safer and more eﬃcient:
let rec rev’ l acc = match FL.indeed l with
| None -> acc
| Some l -> rev’ (FL.tail l) (cons (FL.head l) acc)
The code is basically the same as before, but it checks for null only once. The inferred
type of rev’ is the same as that of rev, that is, ’a list -> ’a list -> ’a list.
The indeed function constructs an option value that is deconstructed by rev’
right away. We can eliminate this tagging overhead by changing our code to contin-
uation-passing style.
module FL : sig ...
val indeed : ’a list -> (unit -> ’w) -> (’a fullList -> ’w) -> ’w
let indeed l onn onf = if null l then onn () else onf l
...
let rec revc’ l acc = FL.indeed l (fun () -> acc)
(fun l -> revc’ (FL.tail l) (cons (FL.head l) acc))
2.1 Extending a kernel of trust
This example illustrates the basic features of our approach. A security kernel FL
implements an abstract data type fullList. A fullList at run time is the same as
a regular list and need not impose any overhead (it helps to use a defunctorizing
compiler such as MLton). The point of fullList is to certify a safety condition at
compile time, in that a (non-bottom) fullList value is never null. The functions
FL.head and FL.tail use this certiﬁcate in the type of their argument (rather than
a dynamic check) to assure themselves that the access is safe.
Essentially, fullList (on which FL.head and FL.tail are deﬁned) is a subtype
of list [2]. However, to avoid extending the underlying type system with this
subtyping, we make projection explicit as indeed, and injection explicit as unfl.
Experience with toEnum, fromEnum, fromIntegral, etc. in Haskell suggests that the
resulting notational overhead is bearable, even familiar.
Another way to view the fullList certiﬁcate is as a capability [14] that autho-
rizes access to the list components. This capability is static because it is expressed
in a type rather than a value [32]. This idea, to express the result of a dynamic
value test as a static type certiﬁcate, is important in dependent-type programming
[1, Section 5]. It is reminiscent of safe type-casting in type dynamic and of the
type-equality assertions of Pašalić et al. [21].
As above, the functions in the security kernel are generally simple and not re-
cursive. In contrast, the client code whose safety we eventually wish to assure (rev
in our example) is recursive. This pattern recurs throughout this paper: in the
most complex example, Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search, the client code is imper-
ative and nonprimitively recursive, yet the security kernel relies merely on addition,
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subtraction, and comparison.
Of course, safety depends on the fact that the capability is only issued for a
nonempty list. Thus the security kernel has to be veriﬁed, perhaps formally. Because
FL.fullList is opaque, we need only check that indeed issues the capability only
when the list is nonempty. This claim is straightforward to prove formally:
• On one hand, we could prove along the operational lines of Moggi and Sabry [17]
and Walker et al. [32] that no expression evaluates to an empty fullList.
• Or, we could show along the denotational lines of Launchbury and Jones [11] that
the functions in FL are parametric even when the logical relation for fullList
excludes the empty fullList [15].
Either way, our proof is simpler than these authors’ (for example, the logical rela-
tion may be unary rather than binary) because our safety condition is simpler (for
example, we do not prove that the fullList does not escape some dynamic extent
of execution).
2.2 Formalization
We now formally verify safety, by translating from a language called Strict to a
language called Lax. We specify the security kernel by Strict and implement it in
Lax. Figure 1 shows the type systems of both Strict and Lax, which extend System F
and diﬀer in only one rule. Strict’s distinguished typing rule looks ‘fancy’ and has
the ﬂavor of dependent types. However, it simply ascribes a type to an expression
of a particular syntactic structure, just like the other, more familiar rules.
The dynamic small-step semantics of these languages are the same and standard.
The only interesting reduction rules are the following (where E1, etc. are all values):
head (nonempty E1 :: E2) ⇀ E1
tail (nonempty E1 :: E2) ⇀ E2
indeed nil E1 E2 ⇀ E1
indeed (E :: E′) E1 E2 ⇀ E2(nonempty E :: E
′)
(1)
For example, both Strict and Lax admit the following transition, which starts to
compute the head of the list 5 :: 7 :: nil.
indeed (5 :: 7 :: nil) 0 (λx. head x) ⇀ (λx. head x)
(
nonempty (5 :: 7 :: nil)
)
(2)
We have formally proved, in Twelf, 1 that the type system of Strict is sound:
it essentially performs abstract interpretation conservatively to ensure that a well-
typed Strict program never tries to take the head or tail of an empty list. For
1 http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Computation/safety.elf
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Metavariables
Term variables x, y, z
Terms E
Type variables s, t
Types N,T,W
Natural numbers m,n
Typing rules shared between Strict and Lax
T :  T ′ : 
T → T ′ : 
[t : ]
·
·
·
T ′ : 
∀t. T ′ :  Int : 
T : 
List T : 
T : 
List+ T : 
T : 
[x : T ]
·
·
·
E : T ′
λx.E : T → T ′
E1 : T → T
′ E2 : T
E1E2 : T
′
[t : ]
·
·
·
E : T ′
Λt. E : ∀t. T ′
E : ∀t. T ′ T : 
ET : T ′ {t → T}
n : Int
T : 
nil : List T
E1 : T E2 : List T
E1 :: E2 : List T
E : List T E1 : W E2 : List
+ T → W
indeed E E1 E2 : W
E : List+ T
head E : T
E : List+ T
tail E : List T
Typing rule in Strict
E1 : T E2 : List T
nonempty (E1 :: E2) : List
+ T
Typing rule in Lax
E : List T
nonempty E : List+ T
Fig. 1. Formalizing empty-list checking
example, the two terms in (2) have the following typing derivations.
·
·
·
5 :: 7 :: nil : List Int 0 : Int
·
·
·
λx.head x : List+ Int → Int
indeed (5 :: 7 :: nil) 0 (λx.head x) : Int
(3)
·
·
·
λx.head x : List+ Int → Int
5 : Int
·
·
·
7 :: nil : List Int
nonempty (5 :: 7 :: nil) : List+ Int
(λx. head x)
(
nonempty (5 :: 7 :: nil)
)
: Int
(4)
The soundness of Strict relies on its distinguished typing rule: this is the only
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introduction rule for the type List+ T . Values of that type can only be constructed
by attaching a special data constructor “nonempty” to a list. The typing rule of
Strict stipulates that “nonempty” must be attached to a manifestly nonempty list.
In contrast, the typing system of Lax permits attaching “nonempty” to any list;
therefore, the type system of Lax is not sound. For example, the term
head (nonempty nil) (5)
is typable but stuck. However, Lax has the advantage that it is trivial to embed
into a programming language like OCaml or Haskell, because it replaces Strict’s
fancy typing rule for “nonempty” with a dull one. Clearly, “nonempty” is akin to a
newtype in Haskell and needs no run-time representation.
To relate these two languages, we deﬁne a syntax-directed translation from Strict
to Lax. In this section, this relaxation map is simply the identity function on terms
and types. Relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and (the transitive closure of)
transitions.
We call a Lax program sandboxed if it is typable using only those typing rules
shared between Strict and Lax (that is, it does not use “nonempty”). Clearly, every
(well-typed) sandboxed Lax program is the relaxation of some (well-typed) Strict
program. Because a well-typed Strict program does not get stuck, neither does a
well-typed sandboxed Lax program, even though the latter may well transition to a
non-sandboxed term such as (2), which uses “nonempty”.
When we embed Lax into Haskell or OCaml, the implementation of the rules (1)
becomes the security kernel. Sandboxing stipulates that the data constructor “non-
empty” may appear in the kernel only, not in the embedding of a sandboxed Lax
program. We enforce this stipulation using Haskell or OCaml’s module system. The
security kernel is correct if it implements the reduction rules of (1). We can check
that the kernel is correct by inspecting it informally or verifying it formally.
3 Array-bound checking
We next illustrate our approach on the problem of array-bound checking in binary
search [34]. This example involves array-index arithmetic and recursion. All index-
ing operations are statically guaranteed safe without run-time overhead. We show
OCaml code below; the same idea works in Haskell 98 with higher-rank types. The
type annotations we require are far simpler than those in Dependent ML. Also, only
the small security kernel needs annotations, not the rest of the program.
Below is Xi and Pfenning’s original code for the example in Dependent ML [34,
Figure 3; see also http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~hwxi/DML/examples/].
datatype ’a answer = NONE | SOME of int * ’a
assert sub <| {n:nat, i:nat | i < n } ’a array(n) * int(i) -> ’a
assert length <| {n:nat} ’a array(n) -> int(n)
fun(’a){size:nat}
bsearch cmp (key, arr) =
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let
fun look(lo, hi) =
if hi >= lo then
let
val m = lo + (hi - lo) div 2
val x = sub(arr, m)
in
case cmp(key, x) of LESS => look(lo, m-1)
| EQUAL => (SOME(m, x))
| GREATER => look(m+1, hi)
end
else NONE
where look <| {l:nat, h:int | 0 <= l <= size /\ 0 <= h+1 <= size}
int(l) * int(h) -> ’a answer
in
look (0, length arr - 1)
end
where bsearch <| (’a * ’a -> order) ->
’a * ’a array(size) -> ’a answer
The text after <| are dependent-type annotations that the programmer must specify.
3.1 An attempt: parameterized modules
This example diﬀers from the one in Section 2 in an important way. There, we
merely need to distinguish a nonempty list from a general list, so one abstract type
’a fullList is enough. Here, to ensure that an array of size n is only accessed
with non-negative indices less than n, we need two abstract types for each n: one
for arrays of size n and one for non-negative indices less than n. That is, we need
two inﬁnite type families, parameterized by the array size n. Because the value n is
only known at run-time, dependent types seem called for.
Even though OCaml is usually not considered dependently typed, we can build
such type families in OCaml, by encapsulating type declarations into a module
parameterized over a value signature, and instantiating such a module inside a let
expression [7]. The interface and implementation of our trusted kernel would then
look like the following. 2
module TrustedKernel(A : sig val length : int end) : sig
type ’a barray
type bindex
val brand : ’a array -> ’a barray
...
val bget : ’a barray -> bindex -> ’a
end = struct
type ’a barray = ’a array
type bindex = int
let brand a = assert (Array.length a = A.length); a
2 The complete code is available online at
http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/ML/eliminating-array-bound-check-functor.ml
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...
let bget = Array.unsafe_get
end
let bsearch cmp (key, arr) =
let module BA = TrustedKernel
(struct let length = Array.length arr end) in
let arr = BA.brand arr in ...
A (non-bottom) value of type ’a BA.barray is an array of size n, and a (non-bottom)
value of type BA.bindex is a non-negative index less than n, where n is the size of
the array arr in scope for constructing the instance of module BA. Consequently, if
the expression BA.get a i is well typed and a and i are non-bottom values, then
the index i is within the bounds of the array a. 3
Because TrustedKernel is stateless, it can assure array-bound safety by relying
merely on the fact that instances of module BA for diﬀerent values of length are
type-incompatible in OCaml. However, in the general case where the kernel has
eﬀects such as state, we need generative type abstraction: any two instantiations
of module BA should be type-incompatible, even with the same length [3]. This
generativity also corresponds to the “fresh region index” of Moggi and Sabry [17,
Figure 4].
Alas, functors are not generative in OCaml. They are in SML, but most imple-
mentations (including SML/NJ) do not allow constructing a module inside let.
3.2 The solution: higher-rank types
Our solution is to emulate the generative module BA above using higher-rank types
[16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. The OCaml code below corresponds as closely to the
Dependent ML code above as possible, yet is more amenable to formalization. The
emulation also works in Haskell, which does not have local module expressions. 4
Our solution uses not only higher-rank but also higher-kind types. Rather than
using types like ’a barray and bindex, we parameterize them to form types like
(’s,’a) barray and ’s bindex. We call the extra type parameter ’s a brand. 5
Each possible size is represented by a type: perhaps unit represents 0, unit list
represents 1, unit list list represents 2, and so on. Our kernel use these type-
level proxies to brand arrays of that size and indices within that range [21]. We can
3 The code above has a small ineﬃciency, in that the last three lines determine the length of the same
array twice: we determine the length of an array so as to instantiate the TrustedKernel; the brand function
will again obtain the run-time length of the array to make sure it matches the length associated with the
particular instantiation of TrustedKernel. We may try to parameterize the trusted kernel by the array itself
rather than by its length and so deﬁne the kernel as
module TrustedKernel(A : sig type e val a : e array end) ...
However, we must explicitly set the type of the array elements when instantiating TrustedKernel. That
type cannot be polymorphic [7].
4 Our Haskell code is available online at
http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Haskell/eliminating-array-bound-check-literally.hs. A slightly more
general version at http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Haskell/eliminating-array-bound-check.lhs accounts
for Haskell arrays with arbitrary lower and upper bounds.
5 “To burn a distinctive mark into or upon with a hot iron, to indicate quality, ownership, etc., or to mark
as infamous (as a convict).” —The Collaborative International Dictionary of English
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think of these types as a separate kind Int. We do not care which type represents
which size; in fact, these types do not aﬀect the run-time representation of arrays
and indices at all, and we use higher-rank polymorphism to generate the types
arbitrarily. Hence these types are called phantom types [5].
Suppose that some brand s represents some size n. We ensure that a (non-
bottom) value of type (s,’a) barray is an array of the length n, and a (non-bottom)
value of type s bindex is a non-negative index less than n. This way, a branded
index of the latter type is always in range for a branded array of the former type.
We also deﬁne types ’s bindexL and ’s bindexH, so that a (non-bottom) value
of type s bindexL is a non-negative index, and a (non-bottom) value of the type
s bindexH is an index i less than n.
Our security kernel is a module with the following signature.
sig
type (’s,’a) barray
type ’s bindex
type ’s bindexL
type ’s bindexH
type (’w,’a) brand_k =
{bk : ’s . (’s,’a) barray * ’s bindexL * ’s bindexH -> ’w}
val brand : ’a array -> (’w,’a) brand_k -> ’w
val bmiddle : ’s bindex -> ’s bindex -> ’s bindex
val index_cmp : ’s bindexL -> ’s bindexH ->
(unit -> ’w) -> (* if > *)
(’s bindex -> ’s bindex -> ’w) -> (* if <= *)
’w
val bsucc : ’s bindex -> ’s bindexL
val bpred : ’s bindex -> ’s bindexH
val bget : (’s,’a) barray -> ’s bindex -> ’a
val unbi : ’s bindex -> int
end
As in Section 2, we use continuation-passing style to avoid tagging overhead. The
branding operation brand has an essentially higher-rank type: because higher-rank
types in OCaml are limited to records, we deﬁne a record type brand_k with a
universally quantiﬁed type variable ’s. Besides branding arrays and indices, the
kernel also performs range- (hence, brand-) preserving operations on indices: bsucc
increments an index; bpred decrements an index; and bmiddle averages two indices.
The operation index_cmp l h k1 k2 compares an indexL with an indexH. If the
former does not exceed the latter, we convert both values to bindex and pass them
to the continuation k2. Otherwise, we evaluate the thunk k1.
Given such a kernel, we can write the binary search function as follows.
let bsearch’ cmp (key,(arr,lo,hi)) =
let rec look lo hi = index_cmp lo hi (fun () -> None)
(fun lo’ hi’ ->
let m = bmiddle lo’ hi’ in
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let x = bget arr m in
let cmp_r = cmp (key,x) in
if cmp_r < 0 then look lo (bpred m)
else if cmp_r = 0 then Some (unbi m, x)
else look (bsucc m) hi)
in
look lo hi
let bsearch cmp (key, arr) =
brand arr {bk = fun arrb -> bsearch’ cmp (key, arrb)}
The code follows Xi and Pfenning’s Dependent ML code as literally as possible,
modulo syntactic diﬀerences between SML and OCaml. It is instructive to compare
their code with ours. Our algorithm is just as eﬃcient: each iteration involves
one middle-index computation, one element comparison, one index comparison, and
one index increment or decrement. No type annotation is needed. In contrast, the
Dependent ML code requires complex dependent-type annotations, even for internal
functions such as look. The inferred types for our functions are below.
val bsearch’ :
(’a * ’b -> int) ->
’a * ((’c, ’b) barray * ’c bindexL * ’c bindexH) ->
(int * ’b) option = <fun>
val bsearch :
(’a * ’b -> int) -> ’a * ’b array -> (int * ’b) option = <fun>
To complete the code, we need to implement the trusted kernel as a module.
The full code is available online; 6 given below are a few notable excerpts. First, we
need a way to create values of the type (’s,’a) barray that ensure that a value of
the type (s,a) barray is an array of elements of type a whose size is represented by
the type proxy s. Thus we need to generate type proxies for array sizes encountered
at run time. McBride [13] and Kiselyov and Shan [10] show one such approach in
Haskell, which explicitly constructs a type to represent each value. Hayashi [9], Xi
and Pfenning [34], and Stone [30, 31] also represent values at the type level, using
singleton types. These approaches better expose the connection between branding
and dependent types, but they are more general than we need here. We simply
generate a fresh type eigenvariable.
let brand a k = k.bk (a, 0, Array.length a - 1)
The function bmiddle is a brand- (that is, range-) preserving operation on
branded indices. Its type says that all indices involved have the same brand—that
is, the same value range.
val bmiddle : ’s bindex -> ’s bindex -> ’s bindex
let bmiddle i1 i2 = i1 + (i2 - i1)/2
The type of bmiddle corresponds to the proposition
0 ≤ i1 < n ∧ 0 ≤ i2 < n → 0 ≤ bmiddle i1 i2 < n,
6 http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/ML/eliminating-array-bound-check-literally.ml
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Additional typing rules shared between Strict and Lax
N :  T : 
ListN T : 
N : 
IntN : 
N : 
IntNL : 
N : 
IntNH : 
E : List T E′ : ∀s.Lists T → IntsL → Int
s
H → W
brand E E′ : W
E1 : List
N T E2 : Int
N
get E1 E2 : T
EL : Int
N
L EH : Int
N
H E1 : W E2 : Int
N → IntN → W
compare EL EH E1 E2 : W
E1 : Int
N E2 : Int
N
middle E1 E2 : Int
N
E : IntN
succ E : IntNL
E : IntN
pred E : IntNH
E : IntN
unbi E : Int
Additional typing rules in Strict
n¯ : 
E1 : T . . . En : T
array E1 :: . . . En :: nil : List
n¯ T
1 ≤ m ≤ n
mI : Int
n¯
1 ≤ m
mL : Int
n¯
L
m ≤ n
mH : Int
n¯
H
Additional typing rules in Lax
E : List T N : 
array E : ListN T
N : 
mI : Int
N
N : 
mL : Int
N
L
N : 
mH : Int
N
H
Fig. 2. Formalizing array-bound checking
where n is the integer represented by the type proxy s. The implementation for
bmiddle delivers a certiﬁcate for the proposition.
let index_cmp i j ong onle = if i <= j then onle i j else ong ()
let bsucc = succ and bpred = pred
3.3 Formalization
As in Section 2.2, we can verify safety by a syntactic translation from a sound,
fancy language called Strict to an unsound, dull language called Lax. Figure 2
shows how we extend Strict and Lax from Figure 1 with constructs for array-bound
checking. We model an n-element array by an n-element list, whose ﬁrst element has
the index 1. Crucially, we add types n¯ to Strict, which represent natural numbers
(array sizes) n. To maintain compatibility with Lax, these types n¯ are of kind 
rather than a separate kind of type-level naturals.
The dynamic semantics of Strict 7 follows the type system and is standard. For
example, it contains the following small-step transitions, which start to compute the
7 The Twelf formalization is available at http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Computation/safety-array.elf
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middle element of the list 5 :: 7 :: nil.
brand (5 :: 7 :: nil)
(
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
)
⇀
(
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
)
2¯ (array 5 :: 7 :: nil) 1L 2H
⇀∗ get (array 5 :: 7 :: nil) 1I
(6)
The type system of Strict is sound as before; in particular, a well-typed Strict
program never tries to access an array beyond its bounds. For example, the ﬁrst
and last terms above have the following typing derivations.
·
·
·
5 :: 7 :: nil : List Int
·
·
·
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
: ∀s.Lists Int → IntsL → Int
s
H → Int
brand (5 :: 7 :: nil)
(
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
)
: Int
(7)
·
·
·
array 5 :: 7 :: nil : List2¯ Int
1 ≤ 1 ≤ 2
1I : Int
2¯
get (array 5 :: 7 :: nil) 1I : Int
(8)
As in Section 2.2, the soundness of Strict depends on its special typing rules for
the distinguished data constructors such as “array”. In contrast, the corresponding
typing rules in Lax remove the side conditions on array lengths and indices, and so
permit constructing values of the type ListN Int for any Lax type N whatsoever.
For example, the transition
brand (5 :: 7 :: nil)
(
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
)
⇀
(
Λs. λxyz. compare y z 0 λyz. get x (middle y z)
)
N (array 5 :: 7 :: nil) 1L 2H.
(9)
is type-preserving in Lax for any Lax type N (say Int, but not 2¯ because 2¯ is
only a Strict type). Nothing in Lax prevents constructing well-typed values such as
array nil : ListN Int and 5I : Int
N , which, when passed to “get”, cause the computation
to become stuck. Without restricting the use of “array” and index constructors, the
type system of Lax is unsound.
We introduce these restrictions by sandboxing Lax programs, as in Section 2.2.
Sandboxed programs must be typable in Lax using only the typing rules shared with
Strict. As before, we deﬁne relaxation, a syntax-directed translation from Strict to
Lax. This time relaxation is not just identity, but maps n¯ to the N in (9). Still,
relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and (the transitive closure of) transitions.
Because again every (well-typed) sandboxed Lax program is the relaxation of some
(well-typed) Strict program, a well-typed sandboxed Lax program does not get stuck,
even though it may well transition to a non-sandboxed term such as (9), which uses
“array”.
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We have mechanized these type soundness arguments in Twelf, slightly less triv-
ially than in Section 2.2. One crucial lemma is that, if a Strict value has a type of
the form IntT (where T is any type), then T must be of the form n¯ (where n is a
natural number). Intuitively, this lemma means that the type system does not lose
any precision due to our not introducing a separate kind for type-level naturals.
3.4 Multiple arrays of various sizes
A more complex example 8 (suggested by a user and a reviewer) is folding over
multiple arrays of various sizes. Our goal is a Haskell function
marray_fold :: (Ix i, Integral i) =>
(seed -> [e] -> seed) -> seed -> [Array i e] -> seed
which folds over an arbitrary number of arrays, whose lower and upper bounds may
diﬀer. The index ranges of some arrays do not even have to overlap and may be
empty. Neither the number of arrays to process nor their bounds are statically
known, yet we guarantee that all array accesses are within bounds. The key func-
tion in this example brands multiple arrays with a type proxy that represents the
intersection of their index ranges:
brands :: (Ix i, Integral i) => [Array i e] ->
(forall s. ([BArray s i e], BLow s i, BHi s i) -> w) ->
w -> w
brands [arr] consumer onempty =
brand arr (\ (barr,bl,bh) -> consumer ([barr],bl,bh)) onempty
brands (a:arrs) consumer onempty =
brands arrs (\bbars -> brand_merge bbars a consumer onempty)
onempty
brand_merge :: (Ix i, Integral i) =>
([BArray s i e], BLow s i, BHi s i)
-> Array i e
-> (forall s’. ([BArray s’ i e], BLow s’ i, BHi s’ i) -> w)
-> w -> w
brand_merge (bas,(BLow bl),(BHi bh)) (a :: Array i e) k kempty =
let (l,h) = bounds a
l’ = max l bl
h’ = min h bh
in if l’ <= h’ then
k (((BArray a)::BArray () i e) :
(map (\ (BArray a) -> BArray a) bas),
BLow l’, BHi h’)
else kempty
Typing this example in a genuinely dependent type system appears quite challenging.
8 http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Haskell/eliminating-mult-array-bound-check.lhs
O. Kiselyov, C.-c. Shan / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 174 (2007) 79–104 91
4 Types as static capabilities
In the style just exempliﬁed, the programmer begins veriﬁcation by building a
domain-speciﬁc kernel module that represents and defends the desired safety condi-
tion. This kernel provides capabilities to other modules so that they can work safely.
Many safety conditions can be expressed using types as proxies for values.
We now describe each step and the language support they need in turn.
4.1 A domain-speciﬁc kernel of trust
Program veriﬁcation typically begins by ﬁxing an assertion language. Given a pro-
gram, its safety condition is then extracted automatically or speciﬁed manually
before being proven. The soundness of the proof checker guarantees that a veriﬁed
program will behave safely.
While this approach lets the designer of the veriﬁcation framework prove sound-
ness once and for all, the desired safety condition may not reside at the same level of
abstraction as the assertion language. Such a mismatch makes the safety assertion
burdensome to construct formally and brittle to prove automatically. For example,
if the assertions speak of bytes and registers, then it is hard to verify that modular
numbers of diﬀerent moduli are never mixed together. It takes a lot of work today
to translate among layers of representation and verify their correspondence, so this
approach works best at a ﬁxed (often low) level of abstraction, as in proof-carrying
code [19] and typed assembly language [18].
We let the programmer design more of the assertion language. For example, it is
uncontroversial to let the programmer specify a set of events that need to be checked
using temporal logic, rather than ﬁxing a set of events (such as operating-system
calls) to track. This way, even given that the framework is sound, whoever uses
the framework must ensure that the assertions soundly express the safety condition
desired. In exchange, the programmer can mold the assertion language, for example
to express the safety condition for an array index not as a conjunction of inequalities
but as an atomic assertion whose meaning is not known to the veriﬁer.
Now that the veriﬁcation framework no longer knows what the assertions mean,
it can no longer build in axioms to justify atomic assertions: because the program-
mer never deﬁnes events in terms of system calls, the framework needs to be told
when events occur; because the programmer never deﬁnes array bounds in terms of
inequalities, the framework needs to be told how to judge an array index in bounds.
We call this knowledge a kernel of trust, which the programmer creates to represent
domain-speciﬁc safety conditions.
By extending the kernel of trust, the programmer can verify new safety conditions
as needed. Each extension must be scrutinized closely to preserve soundness. In
exchange, we gain a “continuum of correctness” in which the programmer can verify
more safety conditions as needed.
An expressive programming language allows the user to deﬁne and combine a
domain-speciﬁc library of components. In this regard, the kernel of trust is like
any other domain-speciﬁc language: its construction relies on succinct facilities for
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higher-order abstraction.
4.2 Capabilities for extending trust
Our “veriﬁer”, the type system, does not track system calls or solve inequalities, but
propagates certiﬁcates of assertions from the user-deﬁned kernel of trust. Safety
then extends from the kernel to the rest of the program. It turns out that type
systems are good at this propagation: we trust types.
More precisely, we represent trust by type eigenvariables. A type system that sup-
ports either higher-rank polymorphism or existential types generates a type eigen-
variable fresh in the universal introduction or existential elimination rule [22, 23, 24].
An opaque type from another module is another instance of a type eigenvariable [16].
Type eigenvariables are good for representing trust to be propagated, because they
are
• unforgeable (so only the kernel of trust can manufacture them),
• opaque (so their identity is the only information they convey), and
• propagated by type inference (so they extend trust from the kernel to the rest of
the application).
In other words, type eigenvariables turn a static language of types into a capability
language [14].
The notion of a capability [14, Section 3] originated in OS design. A capability
is a “protected ability to invoke arbitrary services provided by other processes” [33].
For a language system to support capabilities [14], access to a particular function-
ality (for example, access to a collection) must only be via an unforgeable, opaque,
and propagated handle. For a computation to use a handle, it must have created
the handle, received it from another computation, or looked it up in the initial en-
vironment. To use a handle, a computation can only propagate it or perform a set
of predetermined actions (for example, read an array).
We represent capabilities as types, so we express safety conditions in types, as
in dependent-type programming. If a program type-checks, then the type system
and the kernel of trust together verify that the safety conditions hold in any run
of the program. In most cases, this static assurance costs us no run-time overhead.
In the remaining cases, an optimizing compiler can discover and eliminate statically
apparent identity functions at compile time. By guaranteeing safety statically, we
can avoid (often excessive) run-time safety checks such as array bound checks.
A capability is commonly viewed as “a pairing of a designated process with a
set of services that the process provides” [14, Section 3]. Hence a special case of
a capability, illustrated in Section 2, is an abstract data type. An abstract data
type certiﬁes the invariants internal to its implementation: if the implementation
preserves the invariants, then the invariants are preserved throughout the application
because only the implementation can manipulate values of the abstract type. In
general, a capability to access an object certiﬁes the safety condition of that object.
Another example is restricting the IO monad to a few actions. In Haskell, many
tasks require the IO monad: ﬁle I/O, invoking foreign functions, asking the OS for
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the time of day or a random number, and so on. The IO monad contains many
actions, so a piece of code that can use the IO monad to generate a random number
can also use IO to overwrite ﬁles on disk and otherwise wreck any guarantee on the
code. Instead of providing the code with the IO monad directly, we can provide
an monad m, where m is a type eigenvariable, along with an action of type m Int
that generates a random integer. Although the program eventually instantiates m
with the IO monad, the opacity of the type eigenvariable m guarantees that the code
can only generate random numbers. This basic idea appears in the encapsulation
of mutable state by Moggi and Sabry [17]. It is also used realistically in the Zipper
ﬁle-system project, to statically enforce process separation.
4.3 Static proxies for dynamic values
To express assertions involving run-time values, we associate each value with a type,
such that type equality entails value equality. We call these types proxies for the
values [21].
The same proxy appearing in the types of multiple values may make additional
operations available from the kernel. For example, the branding described in Sec-
tion 3.2 lets us access an array at an index that is within the bounds of the same
array. This availability is known as rights ampliﬁcation in the capabilities literature.
Miller et al. [14] writes:
With rights ampliﬁcation, the authority accessible from bringing two references
together can exceed the sum of authorities provided by each individually. The
classic example is the can and the can-opener—only by bringing the two together
do we obtain the food in the can.
5 Discussion
We have argued that the Hindley-Milner type system with higher-rank types is a
static capability language with rights ampliﬁcation. Our take on program veriﬁca-
tion is not to prove the safety conditions from a ﬁxed foundation but to rely on
the programmer’s trust in a domain-speciﬁc kernel. Our technique works in exist-
ing languages like Haskell and OCaml, and is compatible with their facilities like
mutable cells, native arrays, and general recursion. It requires a modicum of type
annotations in the kernel only.
We use types to certify properties of values. For example, the type s bindex
in Section 3.2 certiﬁes that the index is a non-negative integer less than the array
size represented by s. The use of an abstract data type whose values can only be
produced by a trusted kernel, and the use of a type system to guarantee this last
property, is due to Robin Milner in the design of Edinburgh LCF back in the early
1970s [8]. (Incidentally, the language ML—whose early oﬀspring OCaml we use in
this paper—was originally designed as a scripting language for the LCF prover.)
Our branding technique builds on this fundamental idea using an inﬁnite family of
abstract data types, indexed by a type proxy for a run-time value. Our approach still
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has the serious limitation that we do not produce independently statically checkable
certiﬁcates.
5.1 On trusting trust
Our lightweight approach depends on a trusted kernel. Because we expect this kernel
to vary across applications and change over time, it is harder to trust the kernel,
compared to a genuine dependent type system. We have only optimistic speculations
to oﬀer at this point.
On one hand, a small kernel may be more amenable to formal treatment than the
entire application at once. Even in our most complex examples, verifying imperative
and nonprimitively recursive code, our trusted kernel had no recursive functions (and
at most relied on simple arithmetic). Seen this way, delineating a kernel of trust
is simply a modular strategy towards complete veriﬁcation. This strategy straddles
the line between proof assistants and programming environments, calling for their
further integration.
On the other hand, programmers may be more productive, and veriﬁcation fail-
ures more informative, if the framework does not force verifying the part of cor-
rectness that is closest to the foundations ﬁrst. After all, successive reﬁnement of
(sketches of) proofs is a time-tested technique. Moving along this “continuum of
correctness” may also give a better idea where the code tends to have bugs, and
hence where to concentrate veriﬁcation.
5.2 Dependent type systems
Altenkirch et al. [1, Section 2] survey dependent type systems and their emulations
[4, 12, 20]. Our use of type proxies and run-time veriﬁable certiﬁcates puts us near
the dependently-typed system MetaD [21]. Our work may be thought of as yet an-
other poor man’s emulation of a dependent type system [6, 13]: instead of putting
values in types, we put type proxies for values in types; instead of trusting strongly
normalizing terms in type theory, we trust a kernel of uninterpreted capabilities;
instead of embracing a new programming practice, we embed in existing program-
ming systems. As Altenkirch et al. write, “many programmers are already ﬁnding
practical uses for the approximants to dependent types which mainstream functional
languages (especially Haskell) admit, by hook or by crook.” We are not just explor-
ing a toy however: we can express complex reasoning (such as multiple-array bound
checking) on real-world applications (such as interfacing to a database) in existing,
well-supported language implementations.
Our lightweight approach reasons about the same topics that dependent type
systems and optimizing compilers tend to reason about: control ﬂow, aliasing, and
ranges. For example, optimizing compilers often perform range analysis to elimi-
nate run-time array-bound checking. However, our reasoning kernel is exposed as
a module, not tucked away in a compiler and hidden from the view of a regular
programmer.
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5.3 Mixing static and dynamic checking
Static program analyses are rarely exact because they approximate program behavior
without knowing dynamic data. The approximation must be conservative, and so
the range analysis, for example, may worry that an index is out of bounds of an array
although in reality it is not. To reduce the approximation error, an analysis may
insert dynamic checks. Exactly the same is the case for lightweight static capabilities,
except the programmer rather than the compiler controls where to insert dynamic
checks. We would expect the programmer to understand the program better than
the compiler does, and hence to know better where dynamic checks are appropriate
and where they are excessive.
A good concrete example is using one index to access two arrays of the same size.
Suppose that we want to feed a branded array ba1 to an array-to-array function
compute_array, which we expect to return another array a2 of equal size. We then
want to access both arrays using one index. Because ba1 is branded before a2 is
created, we cannot brand the two arrays at the same time as in Section 3.4. Instead,
we can forget the branding of ba1, compute the array a2, and assign a2 the brand
of ba1 after a run-time test:
let a2 = compute_array (unbrand ba1)
in brand_as a2 ba1 on_mismatched_size (fun ba2 -> ...)
The arrays ba1 and ba2 now have the same brand. We assume the kernel has generic,
application-independent functions unbrand and brand_as.
If we can prove that compute_array yields an array of size equal to that of
its argument, then we can make the function return a branded array, and thus
eliminate the run-time size test. Because branding can only be done in the kernel,
we must put the function into the kernel, after appropriate rigorous (perhaps formal)
veriﬁcation. The programmer decides whether to expand the trusted kernel for a new
application, balancing the cost of the run-time check against the cost of verifying
the kernel extension.
The brand_as approach is similar to the assert/cast dynamic test in MetaD
[21]. Such a “cop-out” to deciding type equality is necessary anyway in a dependent
type system with general recursion, where type equality is not decidable in general
[1, Section 3].
5.4 Syntactic sugar
Writing conditionals in continuation-passing-style, as we do here, makes for ungainly
code. We also miss pattern matching and deconstructors. These syntactic issues
arise because neither OCaml nor Haskell was designed for this kind of programs.
The ugliness is far from a show stopper, but an incentive to develop front ends to
improve the appearance of lightweight static capabilities in today’s programming
languages.
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Appendix: Knuth-Morris-Pratt string matching in De-
pendent ML and Haskell
We borrow another involved example from Xi and Pfenning [34], Knuth-Morris-
Pratt string matching (KMP). This algorithm uses mutable arrays whose elements’
values determine indices in turn. It also uses the deliberately one-oﬀ index −1 as
a special ﬂag. Our Haskell code 9 using higher-rank types has the same run-time
costs and static guarantees as the Xi and Pfenning’s Dependent ML code: all array
and string operations are veriﬁed to be safe.
The Dependent ML code (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ hwxi/DML/examples/
kmpHard.mini), is quoted below for the sake of reference. The code contains (af-
ter <|) a fair amount of DML annotations: declarations of dependent types. The
function sub is a DML array access operation with no bound check. The functions
arrayShift, subShift and updateShift are the creator, the accessor and the setter
for shiftArray, whose element type is dependent on the run-time value, the length
9 http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Haskell/KMP-deptype.hs
~
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of the pattern string.
structure KMP =
struct
assert sub <| {size:nat, i:int | 0 <= i < size}
’a array(size) * int(i) -> ’a
and length <| {n:nat} ’a array(n) -> int(n)
fun{slen:nat, plen:nat}
kmpMatch(str, pat) =
let
type intShift = [i:int| 0 <= i+1 < plen ] int(i)
assert arrayShift <| {size:nat}
int(size) * intShift -> intShift array(size)
and subShift <| {size:nat, i:int | 0 <= i < size}
intShift array(size) * int(i) -> intShift
and updateShift <| {size:nat, i:int | 0 <= i < size}
intShift array(size) * int(i) * intShift -> unit
val slen = length(str)
and plen = length(pat)
val shiftArray = arrayShift(plen, ~1)
fun loopShift(i, j) = (* calculate the shift array *)
if (j = plen) then ()
else
if sub(pat, j) <> sub(pat, i+1) then
if (i >= 0) then
loopShift(subShift(shiftArray, i), j)
else loopShift(~1, j+1)
else ((if (i+1 < j)
then updateShift(shiftArray, j, i+1)
else ()) <| unit;
loopShift(subShift(shiftArray, j), j+1))
where loopShift <| {j:int | 0 < j <= plen}
intShift * int(j) -> unit
val _ = loopShift(~1, 1)
fun loop(s, p) = (* this the main search function *)
if p < plen then
if s < slen then
if sub(str, s) = sub(pat, p) then loop(s+1, p+1)
else
if (p = 0) then loop(s+1, p)
else loop(s, subShift(shiftArray, p-1)+1)
else ~1
else s - plen
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where loop <| {s:nat, p:nat | s <= slen /\ p <= plen}
int(s) * int(p) -> int
in
loop(0, 0)
end
where kmpMatch <| int array(slen) * int array(plen) -> int
end
Our Haskell code extensively uses lightweight static capabilities with rights am-
pliﬁcation. To properly model the DML code, we will be using array-like so-called
‘packed’ Haskell strings. We perform imperative computations in the ST monad and
use the mutable array data type STArray to realize shiftArray.
Our main function kmpMatch has no correspondence in the DML code, because
the latter does not seem to deﬁne the handling of empty strings or patterns. It is not
clear what happens if the DML function kmpMatch is invoked with the empty pat-
tern; probably a compiler error is reported because the (dependent) type intShift
becomes unpopulated. Our approach however forces us to confront the issue; in par-
ticular, to resolve what happens when both the string and the pattern are empty.
kmpMatch str pat =
brandPS str
(\bstrlen ->
brandPS pat (\bpatlen -> runST (kmpMatch’ bstrlen bpatlen))
0 -- empty pattern, matches the beginning of (nonempty) string
)
(-1) -- empty string, doesn’t match any pattern
The KMP algorithm itself, for nonempty str and pat, is as follows. It rather closely
resembles the DML code:
kmpMatch’ (bstr,slen) (bpat,plen) =
do
shiftArray <- arrayShift plen index_m1
let -- loopShift :: IntShift r -> BIndexP1 r -> ST s ()
loopShift i j = -- calculate the shift array
index_p_lt j plen (Else $ return ())
(\j’ -> let i1 = intshift_succ i
in if bpat !. j’ /= bpat !. i1
then index_m_gt i index_m1
(Else $ loopShift index_m1
(index_succ j’))
(\i’ -> do
i’’ <- subShift shiftArray i’
loopShift i’’ j)
else do
index_lt i1 j’
(Else $ return ())
(updateShift shiftArray j’)
i’’ <- subShift shiftArray j’
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loopShift i’’ (index_succ j’)
)
loopShift index_m1 index_p1
let -- loop :: Nat -> Nat -> ST s Int
loop s p = -- this the main search function
nat_p_lt p plen (Else $ return $ (unNat s) - (unP1 plen))
(\p’ ->
nat_p_lt s slen (Else $ return (-1))
(\s’ ->
if bstr !. s’ == bpat !. p’
then loop (nat_succ s) (nat_succ p)
else index_pred p’ (Else $ loop (nat_succ s) p)
(\p1 -> do
i <- subShift shiftArray p1
loop s $ i2n (intshift_succ i))
)
)
loop nat_0 nat_0
It is instructive to compare the inferred type of loopShift or loop with the
annotations in the corresponding DML code. The annotations cannot be inferred
and must be speciﬁed by the programmer. The appearance of the Haskell code
can be improved if we replace various comparison functions such as index_p_lt,
nat_p_lt, etc. with one (type-class) overloaded inﬁx operator, e.g., <.
We now describe the trusted kernel for our Haskell code; the kernel also imple-
ments functions that correspond to DML’s dependently-typed built-ins sub, length,
arrayShift, etc. The kernel uses a number of wrapper types such as BIndex, which
represent various capabilities. These wrappers are newtypes and so have no run-time
cost. The data constructors of the wrappers must not be exported from the trusted
kernel; only the kernel should be allowed to create the capabilities.
The capabilities such as BIndex r or BPackedString r are tagged by a phan-
tom type r, which is a type proxy for a positive natural number plen (the length
of a nonempty string). The wrapper types assert particular propositions about the
wrapped values and plen (neither of which are known at compile time). The func-
tions creating wrapped values must be veriﬁed to make sure the propositions hold.
newtype BIndex r = BIndex Int
newtype BPackedString r = BPackedString PackedString
The type BIndex r asserts that the wrapped integer i satisﬁes 0 <= i < plen
where plen is the integer represented by the proxy r. This newtype declaration
corresponds to DML’s {j:int | 0 <= j < plen}. Likewise, BPackedString r is
a type proxy for a nonempty packed string of the size represented by r. Since the
type BIndex r assures that the index is deﬁnitely within the bounds of the string
BPackedString r, we could safely use unsafeIndexPS to access the element of the
packed string:
infixl 5 !.
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(!.):: BPackedString r -> BIndex r -> Char
(BPackedString s) !. (BIndex i) = indexPS s i
We introduce two other type proxies, for oﬀset indices: BIndexP1 r asserts that
the wrapped integer j satisﬁes 0 < j <= plen; IntShift r is a type proxy for the
integer i such that 0 <= (i + 1) < plen. It is instructive to compare the latter with
the DML declaration of the dependent type intShift.
newtype BIndexP1 r = BIndexP1 Int
newtype IntShift r = IntShift Int
The type proxy r is actually an eigenvariable, introduced by the following func-
tion after a check that the packed string (whose length is plen) is indeed nonempty:
brandPS:: PackedString
-> (forall r. (BPackedString r, BIndexP1 r) -> w) -> w -> w
brandPS str k kempty =
let l = lengthPS str
in if l > 0 then k (BPackedString str, BIndexP1 l)
else kempty
We also introduce the mutable shiftArray and its getters and setters. The type
BShiftArray makes it clear that the range of values of all the elements is bounded
by the positive integer represented by r. Therefore, we could have safely used
unsafeReadArray and unsafeWriteArray operations.
newtype BShiftArray r s = BShiftArray (STArray s Int (IntShift r))
arrayShift :: BIndexP1 r -> IntShift r -> ST s (BShiftArray r s)
arrayShift (BIndexP1 r) e = newArray (0,r) e >>= return . BShiftArray
subShift :: BShiftArray r s -> BIndex r -> ST s (IntShift r)
subShift (BShiftArray arr) (BIndex i) = readArray arr i
updateShift :: BShiftArray r s -> BIndex r -> IntShift r -> ST s ()
updateShift (BShiftArray arr) (BIndex i) v = writeArray arr i v
The rest of the kernel is a (quite general purpose) index operation library. To
save space, we elide repetitive fragments; the full code is available at
http://pobox.com/~oleg/ftp/Haskell/KMP-deptype.hs.
newtype Else w = Else w -- Just a syntactic sugar
unP1 (BIndexP1 i) = i -- forget the branding
index_m1 :: IntShift r
index_m1 = IntShift (-1)
index_p1 :: BIndexP1 r
index_p1 = BIndexP1 1
intshift_succ :: IntShift r -> BIndex r
intshift_succ (IntShift i) = BIndex (succ i)
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index_succ :: BIndex r -> BIndexP1 r
index_succ (BIndex i) = BIndexP1 (succ i)
It is straightforward to verify the safety propositions associated with the above
terms. For example, -1 indeed satisﬁes i : int‖0 <= i + 1 < plen for any positive
plen represented by r, and so IntShift (-1) is justiﬁed.
One of the interesting operations is the comparison of indices, e.g., the com-
parison of two BIndexP1. If the ﬁrst is less than the second, we invoke the onless
continuation, passing the ﬁrst BIndexP1 converted to BIndex. The safety proposition
takes the form
0 < i ≤ plen ∧ 0 < j ≤ plen ∧ i < j → 0 ≤ i < plen
whose conclusion justiﬁes the use of BIndex in the result:
index_p_lt :: BIndexP1 r -> BIndexP1 r ->
Else w -> (BIndex r -> w) -> w
index_p_lt (BIndexP1 i) (BIndexP1 j) (Else onother) onless =
if i < j then onless (BIndex i) else onother
Another interesting operation is decrementing the index. If the index is already
zero, we invoke the onzero continuation. The safety proposition is
0 ≤ i < plen ∧ i = 0 → 0 ≤ i− 1 < plen
whose conclusion again justiﬁes the use of BIndex in the result:
index_pred :: BIndex r -> Else w -> (BIndex r -> w) -> w
index_pred (BIndex i) (Else onzero) onfurther =
if i == 0 then onzero else onfurther (BIndex (pred i))
The Haskell KMP code also uses the type proxy Nat for a non-negative integer.
We elide the corresponding operations.
We should stress again the opportunity of making the syntax better by using
overloaded functions and operators. The fact all these branded values have distinct
types facilitates such overloading.
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